Social loafing

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=== Incentives ===
 
=== Incentives ===
According to research, the occurrence of social loafing can be mitigated by introducing specific incentives which lead to an increase of performance that an individual displays in a group setting.<ref name="Shepperd">Shepperd, J.A. (2001) ''Social loafing and expectancy-value theory'' in ''Multiple Perspectives on the Effects of Evaluation of Performance: Toward an Integratiom''. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers.</ref> These incentives can be external or internal in their nature, and attempt to attach a sense of value on the one hand, or urgency on the other hand to contributing towards a task. As research is suggesting, a setting in which individual contributions cannot be identfied promotes social loafing not only in the individual case but on a collective level. This can be attributed to the fact, that individuals are subjected to less pressure to make a sufficient effort because they can neither be sanctioned for a poor performance nor rewarded for their achievements. <ref name="Kerr">Kerr, N.L., Bruun, S.E. (1981) ''Ringelmann Revisited:'' ''Alternative Explanations for the Social Loafing Effect''. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 1981, 224-231.</ref> While the ability to identify an individual contribution is an important step towards the avoidance of social loafing, this measure alone is not sufficient. Through a study performed by Stephen Harkins and Jeffrey Jackson it was concluded, that the performance of an individual does not only have to be identifiable but also quantifiable through evaluation.<ref name="Jackson">Jackson, J.M., Harkins, S.G. (1985) ''Equity in Effort:'' ''An Explanation of the Social Loafing Effect''. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 49, No. 5, 1199-1206.</ref> Experimentally they found that test subjects who were led to believe that their contribution to a task were not quantifiable despite being identified, did not show any more effort than test subjects that were making contributions which could not be identified.
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According to research, the occurrence of social loafing can be mitigated by introducing specific incentives which lead to an increase of performance that an individual displays in a group setting.<ref name="Shepperd">Shepperd, J.A. (2001) ''Social loafing and expectancy-value theory'' in ''Multiple Perspectives on the Effects of Evaluation of Performance: Toward an Integratiom''. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers.</ref> These incentives can be external or internal in their nature, and attempt to attach a sense of value on the one hand, or urgency on the other hand to contributing towards a task. As research is suggesting, a setting in which individual contributions cannot be identfied promotes social loafing not only in the individual case but on a collective level. This can be attributed to the fact, that individuals are subjected to less pressure to make a sufficient effort because they can neither be sanctioned for a poor performance nor rewarded for their achievements. <ref name="Kerr">Kerr, N.L., Bruun, S.E. (1981) ''Ringelmann Revisited:'' ''Alternative Explanations for the Social Loafing Effect''. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 1981, 224-231.</ref> While the ability to identify an individual contribution is an important step towards the avoidance of social loafing, this measure alone is not sufficient. Through a study performed by Stephen Harkins and Jeffrey Jackson it was concluded, that the performance of an individual does not only have to be identifiable but also quantifiable through evaluation.<ref name="Jackson">Jackson, J.M., Harkins, S.G. (1985) ''Equity in Effort:'' ''An Explanation of the Social Loafing Effect''. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 49, No. 5, 1199-1206.</ref> Experimentally they found that test subjects who were led to believe that their contribution to a task were not quantifiable despite being identified, did not show any more effort than test subjects that were making contributions which could not be identified. The conclusion is therefore that only the combination of making the contribution of an individual to a group task both identifiable and quantifiable works as a sufficiently potent external incentive.
  
 
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Revision as of 22:54, 15 February 2022

developed by Julian Schmidt

Contents

Abstract

The concept of social loafing describes the phenomenon which leads to the reduction of the individual contribution to a collective effort, compared to the effort an individual would make when working alone.[1] Resulting from this effect a group can often times not fulfil its full potential, and the overall performance is reduced. While the phenomenon was initially described by French researcher Max Ringelmann in the early twentieth century, the term social loafing was introduced by Bibb Latané, et al., in 1979.[2] In the following decades the topic has been covered in research with a broad spectrum of perspectives, which have produced a multitude of theories for causes and mitigation techniques.

A popular theory that attempts to explain the phenomenon of social loafing is the concept of evaluation-potential.[3] It proposes that the degree to which an individual contribution of a group member is identifiable will determine the likelihood of that individual to either be involved or to socially loaf. Another angle towards explaining social loafing in group situations is the social impact theory which describes the linkage between social forces and the behaviour of a person. [4] The theory postulates that when a member of a group is exposed to external social forces, the group has a shielding function and thereby reduces the need of the person to act according to the pressure. Other theories in the evolving field of research address aspects such as an individual’s perception of his or her own contribution in a group setting or the sense of fairness with regards to the equity of effort of different team members. Strategies that aim to mitigate the occurrence of social loafing address specific structural changes that can be implemented in the set-up and functioning of groups, but also include special incentives targeted at individual members.

Overview of social loafing

Research

Historical considerations, experiments


Observations

Gender and cultural aspects

Examples

Theoretical discussion

"Cause 1" (Name)

"Cause 2" (Name)

"Cause 3" (Name)

Mitigation

"Strategy 1" (Name)

"Strategy 2" (Name)

Incentives

According to research, the occurrence of social loafing can be mitigated by introducing specific incentives which lead to an increase of performance that an individual displays in a group setting.[1] These incentives can be external or internal in their nature, and attempt to attach a sense of value on the one hand, or urgency on the other hand to contributing towards a task. As research is suggesting, a setting in which individual contributions cannot be identfied promotes social loafing not only in the individual case but on a collective level. This can be attributed to the fact, that individuals are subjected to less pressure to make a sufficient effort because they can neither be sanctioned for a poor performance nor rewarded for their achievements. [5] While the ability to identify an individual contribution is an important step towards the avoidance of social loafing, this measure alone is not sufficient. Through a study performed by Stephen Harkins and Jeffrey Jackson it was concluded, that the performance of an individual does not only have to be identifiable but also quantifiable through evaluation.[6] Experimentally they found that test subjects who were led to believe that their contribution to a task were not quantifiable despite being identified, did not show any more effort than test subjects that were making contributions which could not be identified. The conclusion is therefore that only the combination of making the contribution of an individual to a group task both identifiable and quantifiable works as a sufficiently potent external incentive.

external

internal

Limitations

Annotated Bibliography

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Shepperd, J.A. (2001) Social loafing and expectancy-value theory in Multiple Perspectives on the Effects of Evaluation of Performance: Toward an Integratiom. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  2. Latané, B., Williams, K., Harkins, S., (1979) Many Hands Make Light the Work: The Causes and Consequences of Social Loafing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 37, No. 6, 822-832.
  3. Harkins, S.G., Szymanski, K., (1989) Social Loafing and Group Evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 56, No. 6,934-941.
  4. Frash, R.E., Kline, S., Stahura, J.M., (2004) Mitigating Social Loafing in Team-Based Learning. Journal of Teaching in Travel & Tourism, 3:4, 57-77.
  5. Kerr, N.L., Bruun, S.E. (1981) Ringelmann Revisited: Alternative Explanations for the Social Loafing Effect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 1981, 224-231.
  6. Jackson, J.M., Harkins, S.G. (1985) Equity in Effort: An Explanation of the Social Loafing Effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 49, No. 5, 1199-1206.
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