Overcoming the Planning Paradox
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The point of departure for this analysis will be a civilian reading of military theory<ref name="osinga">F. Osinga, ''Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd'' (Eburon Academic Publishers 2005)</ref>, grounded in the appreciation that war is an endeavor with dynamic and unforgiving external constraints where leadership complacency is punished severely. | The point of departure for this analysis will be a civilian reading of military theory<ref name="osinga">F. Osinga, ''Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd'' (Eburon Academic Publishers 2005)</ref>, grounded in the appreciation that war is an endeavor with dynamic and unforgiving external constraints where leadership complacency is punished severely. | ||
The following is based on the premise that civilian organizations can learn from experienced military leaders accustomed to navigating volatile situations.<ref>[''http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy90160.000/hsy90160_0.htm''] Hearing on the Organizational Challenges in NASA in the wake of the Columbia Disaster: ''Testimony of Adm. Rickover''</ref> | The following is based on the premise that civilian organizations can learn from experienced military leaders accustomed to navigating volatile situations.<ref>[''http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy90160.000/hsy90160_0.htm''] Hearing on the Organizational Challenges in NASA in the wake of the Columbia Disaster: ''Testimony of Adm. Rickover''</ref> | ||
| − | The abstraction level for the analysis in a peaceful context is to seek inspiration in more wicked problems, on how to embrace uncertainty and adapt to surprises in a structured way that touches on all four course dimensions.<ref>[''https://www.doing-projects.org/perspectives''] ''Doing Projects: Perspectives'' </ref> On multiple scales, a popular strategy appears to be reducing organizational complexity by means of flattening leadership structures where swift action is required.<ref>['https://www.nasa.gov | + | The abstraction level for the analysis in a peaceful context is to seek inspiration in more wicked problems, on how to embrace uncertainty and adapt to surprises in a structured way that touches on all four course dimensions.<ref>[''https://www.doing-projects.org/perspectives''] ''Doing Projects: Perspectives'' </ref> On multiple scales, a popular strategy appears to be reducing organizational complexity by means of flattening leadership structures where swift action is required.<ref>['https://www.nasa.gov%2Fpdf%2F45608main_NNBE_Progress_Report2_7-15-03.pdf'] ''NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE) Vol.II'' (NNBE 2003)</ref> This principle is also deployed where every member of a team has the competencies to dynamically transfer leadership based on who has the most situational awareness. The intent of this is to shorten the collective decision cycle or OODA loop<ref name="osinga">F. Osinga, ''Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd'' (Eburon Academic Publishers 2005)</ref> in a dynamic situation, to avoid bottle-necking decision making in a single individual who might be denied sufficient situational awareness to make a productive decision. Here a short summary of factors for cohesion will be provided as well. |
In a project scale perspective, the wide array of Agile Frameworks<ref>['http://wiki.doing-projects.org/index.php/Agile_Project_Management']''Agile Project Management''</ref> have a common aim: Shorten development cycles to face reality in the form of stakeholder feedback on MVP’s. The intent of this strategy is to reality check assumptions and self-correct away from sunk-cost behavior with minimum investment. Here, dysfunctional implementations of Scrum<ref>['https://ronjeffries.com/articles/016-09ff/defense/']Ron Jeffries, ''Dark Scrum'' (Blog Post 2016)</ref> will be explored as a warning against unreflected framework deployment. | In a project scale perspective, the wide array of Agile Frameworks<ref>['http://wiki.doing-projects.org/index.php/Agile_Project_Management']''Agile Project Management''</ref> have a common aim: Shorten development cycles to face reality in the form of stakeholder feedback on MVP’s. The intent of this strategy is to reality check assumptions and self-correct away from sunk-cost behavior with minimum investment. Here, dysfunctional implementations of Scrum<ref>['https://ronjeffries.com/articles/016-09ff/defense/']Ron Jeffries, ''Dark Scrum'' (Blog Post 2016)</ref> will be explored as a warning against unreflected framework deployment. | ||
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== Decision Making Lessons from a Fighter Pilot == | == Decision Making Lessons from a Fighter Pilot == | ||
| + | [[File:Boyd_cycle.jpg|thumb|right|400px|F. Osinga: Simple Boyd Cycle]] | ||
John Richard Boyd was a United States Airforce (USAF) fighter pilot who, after his combat deployment in Korea, got his nickname "forty seconds" from a standing bet he made as an instructor in the USAF Fighter Weapons School(FWS). The bet was that he, within forty seconds, could defeat an opponent from a position of disadvantage in Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM). After instructing he went on to contribute to the development of the F-15 Eagle, as well as laying the strategic foundations for the USAF Lightweight Fighter programme with his Energy-Maneuverability theory of aerial combat. His true legacy is one of tactical and strategical thinking. He was very critical of rigid structure of command and other symptoms of inflexibility. An example of this is found in his "Patterns of Conflict" presentation that compares Napoleon Bonaparte's early and late tactics, scolding the late Emperor for his top-down approach to tactics. His critique was that Napoleons rigid flow of orders was a tactical waste of sound strategy, and that the lack of afforded initiative to the lower parts of the organization was a key factor in his defeat.<br /> | John Richard Boyd was a United States Airforce (USAF) fighter pilot who, after his combat deployment in Korea, got his nickname "forty seconds" from a standing bet he made as an instructor in the USAF Fighter Weapons School(FWS). The bet was that he, within forty seconds, could defeat an opponent from a position of disadvantage in Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM). After instructing he went on to contribute to the development of the F-15 Eagle, as well as laying the strategic foundations for the USAF Lightweight Fighter programme with his Energy-Maneuverability theory of aerial combat. His true legacy is one of tactical and strategical thinking. He was very critical of rigid structure of command and other symptoms of inflexibility. An example of this is found in his "Patterns of Conflict" presentation that compares Napoleon Bonaparte's early and late tactics, scolding the late Emperor for his top-down approach to tactics. His critique was that Napoleons rigid flow of orders was a tactical waste of sound strategy, and that the lack of afforded initiative to the lower parts of the organization was a key factor in his defeat.<br /> | ||
| − | A key concept underpinning Boyd's strategic and tactical teachings is his decision cycle, better known as the OODA loop developed for aerial combat decision making. It is an abbreviation for Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action: First, information is gathered about the situation. Second, the actor must rely on experience to orientate themselves in the situation. Third, a decision must be made before finally acting. This cycle repeats continuously, and Boyd's central point with the decision cycle was that if two adversaries with equal capabilities with respects to skill and resources meet in conflict: Then the pilot who closes the OODA loop the fastest wins. Note that action itself is within the loop as a point of order that needs to be completed before gathering more information.<br/> | + | A key concept underpinning Boyd's strategic and tactical teachings is his decision cycle, better known as the OODA loop developed for aerial combat decision making. It is an abbreviation for Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action: First, information is gathered about the situation. Second, the actor must rely on experience to orientate themselves in the situation. Third, a decision must be made before finally acting. This cycle repeats continuously, and Boyd's central point with the decision cycle was that if two adversaries with equal capabilities with respects to skill and resources meet in conflict: Then the pilot who closes the OODA loop the fastest wins. Note that action itself is within the loop as a point of order that needs to be completed before gathering more information.<br/> |
| + | |||
| + | * '''Observation:''' Raw information about the situation is collected. | ||
| + | * '''Orientation:''' The information is parsed through experience, with subjective analysis of what might happen. | ||
| + | * '''Decision:''' A review of possible courses of action ending in selection. | ||
| + | * '''Action:''' Decision enactment. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Considering the concept of Path Dependency - and by extension the sunk cost fallacy - through Boyd's decision cycle the error becomes glaring: The OODA-loop is not closed and re-initiated, but the actor remains in the last phase - stuck on action without further review of the situation. The situational awareness is not maintained and the action becomes blind and predictable to adversarial response.<br /> | ||
| + | |||
| + | Any given problem or set of problems might develop into a threat, even without adversarial and malicious intent. For example he discovery of a "unknown-unknown" after a project has been scoped and initiated presents a similar management challenge. Continual usage of the Boyd Cycle is a deceptively simple framework for dealing with a developing situation, developed for the worst kind of problem: Another actor seeking to destroy you. The OODA-loop is intended to be applied at all levels, from the operational, through the tactical and up to the strategic level. Abstracted to a civilian context and in summary: The OODA-loop must develop as fast as, or quicker than, the problem being dealt with. | ||
| + | |||
| + | === Implications for Strategic Organization === | ||
| + | Elaboration and contextualization of Boyd's briefings through Osinga. | ||
| + | |||
| + | <blockquote> | ||
| + | What is strategy? A mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonizing and focusing our efforts as a | ||
| + | basis for realizing some aim or purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events | ||
| + | and many contending interests. | ||
| + | ~John Boyd | ||
| + | </blockquote> | ||
| + | |||
| − | |||
== Organizational Structure - Perils and Opportunities == | == Organizational Structure - Perils and Opportunities == | ||
=== NASA & USN === | === NASA & USN === | ||
| + | After the Columbia space shuttle disaster and the following Senate hearings, where the testimony of Admiral Rickover prompted a collaboration between NASA and USN. Rickover managed the US Nuclear Navy, deploying organizational principles that allowed for safe operation of reactors. | ||
=== Kodak, IBM & BEF === | === Kodak, IBM & BEF === | ||
== Contextual Framework Implementation == | == Contextual Framework Implementation == | ||
Revision as of 20:31, 19 February 2023
Contents |
Abstract
This article will explore productive approaches to dealing with the Planning Paradox.
"No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy forces.
Only the layman believes that in the course of a campaign he sees the consistent implementation of an
original thought that has been considered in advance in every detail and retained to the end."
~Field Marshal Moltke the Elder [1]
The point of departure for this analysis will be a civilian reading of military theory[2], grounded in the appreciation that war is an endeavor with dynamic and unforgiving external constraints where leadership complacency is punished severely.
The following is based on the premise that civilian organizations can learn from experienced military leaders accustomed to navigating volatile situations.[3]
The abstraction level for the analysis in a peaceful context is to seek inspiration in more wicked problems, on how to embrace uncertainty and adapt to surprises in a structured way that touches on all four course dimensions.[4] On multiple scales, a popular strategy appears to be reducing organizational complexity by means of flattening leadership structures where swift action is required.[5] This principle is also deployed where every member of a team has the competencies to dynamically transfer leadership based on who has the most situational awareness. The intent of this is to shorten the collective decision cycle or OODA loop[2] in a dynamic situation, to avoid bottle-necking decision making in a single individual who might be denied sufficient situational awareness to make a productive decision. Here a short summary of factors for cohesion will be provided as well.
In a project scale perspective, the wide array of Agile Frameworks[6] have a common aim: Shorten development cycles to face reality in the form of stakeholder feedback on MVP’s. The intent of this strategy is to reality check assumptions and self-correct away from sunk-cost behavior with minimum investment. Here, dysfunctional implementations of Scrum[7] will be explored as a warning against unreflected framework deployment.
Finally, on the Portfolio level this article will also explore the risks of Path Dependence[8] with respect to situational agility. The case studies for this exploration will focus on hesitancies to exploit technological salients[9] that big organizations otherwise appeared to be poised to dominate[10]. This analysis will respect the good intentions of the leadership, attempting to contextualize their hesitations with the organizational complexity they had to work with as well as the corporate cultures they had to navigate. These examples will be picked up with a conclusion on the relative merits and limitations of the tools explored, followed by a recommendations to continually adapt leadership strategies and framework deployment to the situation at hand and keep organizational structure ready for changes as the situation permits.
Decision Making Lessons from a Fighter Pilot
John Richard Boyd was a United States Airforce (USAF) fighter pilot who, after his combat deployment in Korea, got his nickname "forty seconds" from a standing bet he made as an instructor in the USAF Fighter Weapons School(FWS). The bet was that he, within forty seconds, could defeat an opponent from a position of disadvantage in Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM). After instructing he went on to contribute to the development of the F-15 Eagle, as well as laying the strategic foundations for the USAF Lightweight Fighter programme with his Energy-Maneuverability theory of aerial combat. His true legacy is one of tactical and strategical thinking. He was very critical of rigid structure of command and other symptoms of inflexibility. An example of this is found in his "Patterns of Conflict" presentation that compares Napoleon Bonaparte's early and late tactics, scolding the late Emperor for his top-down approach to tactics. His critique was that Napoleons rigid flow of orders was a tactical waste of sound strategy, and that the lack of afforded initiative to the lower parts of the organization was a key factor in his defeat.
A key concept underpinning Boyd's strategic and tactical teachings is his decision cycle, better known as the OODA loop developed for aerial combat decision making. It is an abbreviation for Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action: First, information is gathered about the situation. Second, the actor must rely on experience to orientate themselves in the situation. Third, a decision must be made before finally acting. This cycle repeats continuously, and Boyd's central point with the decision cycle was that if two adversaries with equal capabilities with respects to skill and resources meet in conflict: Then the pilot who closes the OODA loop the fastest wins. Note that action itself is within the loop as a point of order that needs to be completed before gathering more information.
- Observation: Raw information about the situation is collected.
- Orientation: The information is parsed through experience, with subjective analysis of what might happen.
- Decision: A review of possible courses of action ending in selection.
- Action: Decision enactment.
Considering the concept of Path Dependency - and by extension the sunk cost fallacy - through Boyd's decision cycle the error becomes glaring: The OODA-loop is not closed and re-initiated, but the actor remains in the last phase - stuck on action without further review of the situation. The situational awareness is not maintained and the action becomes blind and predictable to adversarial response.
Any given problem or set of problems might develop into a threat, even without adversarial and malicious intent. For example he discovery of a "unknown-unknown" after a project has been scoped and initiated presents a similar management challenge. Continual usage of the Boyd Cycle is a deceptively simple framework for dealing with a developing situation, developed for the worst kind of problem: Another actor seeking to destroy you. The OODA-loop is intended to be applied at all levels, from the operational, through the tactical and up to the strategic level. Abstracted to a civilian context and in summary: The OODA-loop must develop as fast as, or quicker than, the problem being dealt with.
Implications for Strategic Organization
Elaboration and contextualization of Boyd's briefings through Osinga.
What is strategy? A mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonizing and focusing our efforts as a basis for realizing some aim or purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events and many contending interests. ~John Boyd
Organizational Structure - Perils and Opportunities
NASA & USN
After the Columbia space shuttle disaster and the following Senate hearings, where the testimony of Admiral Rickover prompted a collaboration between NASA and USN. Rickover managed the US Nuclear Navy, deploying organizational principles that allowed for safe operation of reactors.
Kodak, IBM & BEF
Contextual Framework Implementation
Conclusion
References
- ↑ H. G. Moltke, Moltkes militärische Werke (E. S. Mittler, 1900) - Digitized by the University of Virginia, 2009
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 F. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (Eburon Academic Publishers 2005)
- ↑ [http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy90160.000/hsy90160_0.htm] Hearing on the Organizational Challenges in NASA in the wake of the Columbia Disaster: Testimony of Adm. Rickover
- ↑ [https://www.doing-projects.org/perspectives] Doing Projects: Perspectives
- ↑ ['https://www.nasa.gov%2Fpdf%2F45608main_NNBE_Progress_Report2_7-15-03.pdf'] NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE) Vol.II (NNBE 2003)
- ↑ ['http://wiki.doing-projects.org/index.php/Agile_Project_Management']Agile Project Management
- ↑ ['https://ronjeffries.com/articles/016-09ff/defense/']Ron Jeffries, Dark Scrum (Blog Post 2016)
- ↑ ['https://www.britannica.com/topic/path-dependence']Britannica: Path Dependence Definition
- ↑ ['https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/actor-network-theory']Science-Direct Overview: Actor Network Theory
- ↑ Prenatt et al.How underdeveloped decision making and poor leadership choices led Kodak into bankrupcy (2015) ['https://www.researchgate.net/profile/M-Saeed-2/publication/354332113_HOW_UNDERDEVELOPED_DECISION_MAKING_AND_POOR_LEADERSHIP_CHOICES_LED_KODAK_INTO_BANKRUPTCY/links/61320a10c69a4e4879768c56/HOW-UNDERDEVELOPED-DECISION-MAKING-AND-POOR-LEADERSHIP-CHOICES-LED-KODAK-INTO-BANKRUPTCY.pdf']
